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Berle and the Entrepreneur 
Charles R. T. O’Kelley† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the first and last four chapters (“the Five Chapters”) of The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property,1 Adolf Berle, Jr. describes in 
sweeping terms a fundamental transformation of the American econo-
my.2  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the dominant economic 
actor was the sole proprietor, who owned and controlled all aspects of his 
business.  By the first quarter of the twentieth century, the “corporate 
system,”3 and the few hundred large, quasi-public corporations of which 
it was composed, had taken control of many sectors of American indus-
try and promised in years to come to gain an increasingly larger share of 
America’s economic wealth and power.4  Berle identified separation of 
ownership from control as the central characteristic of the corporate sys-
tem and its constituent corporations.5  Shareholders supplied the wealth 
but none of the control.  Managers exercised control but took none of the 
risks.  As a result, Berle asserted, one of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying our system of private property no longer held true.  In the 
early nineteenth century, we believed that allowing the businessman to 
                                                 
† Professor and Director, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society, Seattle Uni-
versity School of Law; Martin E. Kilpatrick Chair Emeritus, University of Georgia School of Law.  
My thanks to Kelli Alces, Anita Anand, Jayne Barnard, Michal Barzuza, Jill Fisch, Tom Joo, Joe 
Knight, Ken Lipartito, Jim Mooney, Rafael Pardo, Margaret Sachs, Michael Siebecker, Faith Ste-
velman, Fred Tung, Michael Wachter, Jessica Wang, and Harwell Wells for commenting on an 
earlier draft of this article.  All errors and omissions are, of course, mine. 
 1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 340–41 (MacMillan 1933). 
 2. Berle’s co-author was Gardiner Means.  However, Berle is acknowledged as the principal 
author and overall project director.  See ADOLF A. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971, 
FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 20–21 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs, eds., 
1973) [hereinafter BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS].  The Five Chapters bear Berle’s unmistakable 
mark, containing two themes that continued throughout the remainder of his career: an emphasis on 
the problem of power and a focus on bringing the reality of America more in line with its ideology.  
See infra notes 90–94, 107–123 and accompanying text. 
 3. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 1, 2–4. 
 4. Id. at 2–3, 10–19. 
 5. Id. at 4–7. 
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use his property as he saw fit was socially efficient because, in the pur-
suit of maximum profit, each businessman would find it in his best inter-
est to allocate resources effectively.  In this early nineteenth century 
world, the businessman was a sole proprietor—an entrepreneur—and he 
owned and controlled the business.  He took the consequences, good 
(profits) or bad (losses), resulting from his operation of the business.6  
Berle referred to this as “the traditional logic of profits.”7  But in the 
world of the modern corporation Berle described, ownership and control 
had been separated, undercutting the traditional logic of profits that had 
justified the laissez-faire reliance on private property.8  This raised the 
specter of the concentration of enormous power in the hands of a few 
hundred captains of industry; uncontrolled by the profit motive or by the 
shareholders, these captains of industry would inevitably take for them-
selves powers akin to that of princes to be used for ends of their own 
choosing.9 
Viewed from today, and through a lens dominated by the thinking 
and ideology of neo-classical economists identified with the University 
of Chicago,10 Berle’s critique appears in substantial part to claim that the 
modern corporation is not operated as if by a classic entrepreneur with 
the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.  So viewed, Berle’s critique 
reduces to an empirical question: do the managers of the modern corpo-
ration make decisions substantially similar to those that would be made 
by a true entrepreneur?  If managers act substantially as would a true 
owner/entrepreneur, and if the price a shareholder pays for her stock re-
flects the value of the expected efforts of the managers and not the value 
of the effort that would be expected if the managers owned 100% of the 
firm’s equity, then separation of ownership and control is an illusory 
problem. 
Writing more than ten years before Berle, another seminal scholar, 
Frank Knight,11 addressed this empirical question.  In Risk, Uncertainty 
and Profit,12 Knight developed a theory of the entrepreneur as part of his 
larger effort to more carefully explain the theoretical underpinnings of a 
free-market economy.13  In this work, still considered the leading expli-
                                                 
 6. Id. at 8. 
 7. Id. at 33–44. 
 8. Id. 
 9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 2, 354–55. 
 10. On the characteristics and nature of the “Chicago School of Economics,” see H. Laurence 
Miller, Jr., On the “Chicago School of Economics,” 70 J. POL. ECON. 64 (1962). 
 11. Readers less familiar with Frank Knight may find useful biographical references infra, 
notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
 12. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (Houghton Mifflin 1921). 
 13. Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit serves as an important bridge between classic-
al and neo-classical economics and between an economics devoid of interest in the firm to the mod-
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cation of the role of the entrepreneur, Knight agreed with Berle that un-
ification of ownership and control was essential to the proper functioning 
of a free-market economy.  However, Knight presented a compelling 
argument that the modern corporation was controlled and operated by 
one or more persons who managed the firm in a fashion similar to the 
classical entrepreneur.14 
By the time Berle began working on The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, Knight and Risk, Uncertainty and Profit were at the 
center of debate about economic theory.15  Given Knight’s prominence 
and the fact that Knight apparently reached dramatically different con-
clusions than did Berle concerning the consequences flowing from sepa-
ration of ownership and control, it is initially surprising to discover that 
Berle did not directly cite or acknowledge Knight or his work.  However, 
I will show that not only was Berle familiar with Knight’s work and 
theories, but also that the Five Chapters can be read and understood as 
intended, in part, as Berle’s response to Knight’s theories.  This reading 
of Berle is hidden from view by our misunderstanding of historical con-
text. 
More broadly, I will show that the lens of today results in a dis-
torted view of what motivated Berle and what he was attempting to argue 
and accomplish in his writing of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.  As Berle wrote the Five Chapters, he was increasingly strad-
                                                                                                             
ern focus on developing a theory of the firm.  Knight had two overarching goals.  First, he sought to 
bring coherence to the historic body of theoretical economics, thereby completing the classical econ-
omists’ perfect competition theory project.  Knight explained that objective as follows: 
The aim will be to bring out the content of the assumptions or hypotheses of the historic 
body of economic thought, referred to by the classical writers as ‘natural price’ theory.  
This is meant, not as the assumptions definitely in the minds of the classical economists, 
but the assumptions necessary to define the conditions of perfect competition, at which 
the classical thought was aimed, and which are significant as forming the limiting ten-
dency of actual economic processes. 
Id. at 18.   Second, he sought to go beyond perfect competition theory to provide a coherent theory of 
imperfect competition—how the free enterprise system actually works.  Id. at 179–375.  Central to 
that task was an understanding of uncertainty and its consequences. 
When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the 
ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the productive groups is 
no longer a matter of indifference or a mechanical detail.  Centralization of this deciding 
and controlling function is imperative, a process of ‘cephalization,’ such as has taken 
place in the evolution of organic life, is inevitable, and for the same reasons as in the case 
of biological evolution. 
Id. at 268–69.  In carrying out this sweeping agenda, Knight necessarily focused on the fundamental 
nature of the economic system and the ways in which actual economic organizations—what Coase 
later called firms—differ from the economic organizations that would exist under perfect competi-
tion.  Id. at 264–312, 349–68. 
 14. Charles R. T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 
753, 766–72 (2006). 
 15. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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dling the worlds of theory and practice.  He and other public intellectuals 
were struggling to overcome the prevailing myth of individualism that 
blocked the road to a needed reshaping of the institution of private prop-
erty and a needed adjustment in the national government’s economic 
role.  Berle saw himself playing a lead role in paving the way for what 
was to become known as the New Deal.  He saw The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property, and particularly the Five Chapters, as the cen-
terpiece of a new interpretation of the myth of individualism; he envi-
sioned the revised myth as the cornerstone upon which the New Deal 
would be erected.  To accomplish his myth-making goals, Berle chose to 
identity the myth of individualism in the Five Chapters with the work of 
Adam Smith, rather than the work of Frank Knight.  I will explain why 
Berle made this choice and explore the consequences. 
The article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I summarize the stan-
dard reading of the Five Chapters, an interpretation that is distorted by a 
failure to consider the context within which Berle wrote.  In Part III, I 
present a standard summary of Frank Knight’s free-market theories.  In 
Part IV, I address the question of how familiar Berle was with Knight’s 
work.  In Part V, I present an interpretation of the Five Chapters as a re-
sponse to Frank Knight.  I conclude with some observations concerning 
perhaps surprising similarities in the views of Knight and Berle and pro-
vide a suggestion for how the collective research agenda of corporation 
law scholars might be reoriented in order to deepen and enrich our ongo-
ing study of the corporation, law, and society. 
II.  THE STANDARD READING OF THE FIVE CHAPTERS 
In the Five Chapters,16 Adolf Berle paints a compelling account of 
the death of an economic system dominated by the individual entrepre-
neur and the ascendancy of a new corporate system dominated by the 
modern corporation and its faceless managers.  The old, nineteenth cen-
tury economic order featured numerous small firms, most of which were 
owned by a sole proprietor.  The governing economic and political ideol-
ogy of this period—classic liberalism—idealized the individual and the 
so-called “free-market” economy commonly identified with Adam 
Smith’s “invisible hand.”  Liberalism relegated government to the li-
mited role of protecting the individual’s right to own private property 
and use it in the pursuit of the individual’s self-interest.  In the ideology 
of free-market capitalism, individual consumers and producers govern 
the economy.  Each consumer and producer independently sends and 
responds to price signals concerning available products and services.  
                                                 
 16. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 1–9, 333–57. 
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Each producer and consumer autonomously and freely calculates and 
decides what to buy and sell.  The result is the best possible allocation of 
economic resources.17 
On the production side of the equation, the central actor was the in-
dividual entrepreneur.  She put at risk her wealth, dedicating it to the 
ownership of the firm’s plant and machinery and to guaranteeing the 
payment of monies promised to employees and other creditors.  She also 
put at risk her own human capital—her sweat equity—dedicating it to the 
task of managing the firm.  Her reward (at least if the venture was suc-
cessful) was the firm’s profits.18 
Unification of ownership and control in the individual entrepreneur 
was the linchpin of free-market ideology, and it also served as the under-
lying justification for protecting the entrepreneur’s wealth and ownership 
rights.  Society as a whole, as well as persons working for the entrepre-
neur, could rationally believe that the entrepreneur, spurred by her desire 
for personal gain, would make business decisions intended to achieve the 
highest and best use of her business property.  While some entrepreneurs 
would succeed and others fail, the sum of all entrepreneurs’ business 
judgments and actions would produce the best allocation of societal re-
sources consistent with a free and just society.19 
Berle’s claim was straightforward: the modern corporation and its 
separation of ownership and control undermined the ideology of capital-
ism and the rationale for protecting private property in the means of pro-
duction. 
It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right 
both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full 
fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be re-
lied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any indus-
trial property he may possess. 
In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds.  
As we have seen, it is no longer the individual, himself, who uses 
his wealth.  Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a posi-
tion to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no long-
er as owners entitled to the bulk of such profits. . . .  The explosion 
of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that 
the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its 
effective use.20 
                                                 
 17. O’Kelley, supra note 14, at 757; infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 18. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 271–90. 
 19. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 340–41, 8–9. 
 20. Id. at 8–9. 
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Under the standard reading of the Five Chapters, separation of 
ownership and control adversely affects two groups: society as a whole 
indirectly and shareholders directly.21  Society as a whole loses because 
resources are not allocated to their highest and best use.  Shareholders 
lose because the corporation is not operated for their exclusive benefit: 
It is traditional that a corporation should be run for the benefit of its 
owners, the stockholders, and that to them should go any profits 
which are distributed.  We now know, however, that a control group 
may hold the power to divert profits into their own pockets.  There 
is no longer any certainty that a corporation will in fact be run pri-
marily in the interests of the stockholders.22 
What is to be done about separation of ownership and control?  
Berle sketched three possibilities.  On the one hand, we could attempt to 
make the traditional logic of profit work by bringing social and legal 
pressure to bear “in an effort to insure corporate operation primarily in 
the interests of the ‘owners’ . . . .”23  Alternatively, society could recog-
nize the managerial control group as the new owners of the firm; the ma-
nagerial control group would be entitled to exercise unfettered power 
over the corporation and to receive the profits of the firm as an incentive 
to ensure that resources were allocated to their highest and best use.  The 
third alternative was to subordinate the claims of both ownership and 
control to the larger interests of society.24 
The standard reading of the Five Chapters places heavy emphasis 
on the assertion that the modern corporation is no longer being operated 
for the exclusive benefit of the shareholders.25  If that problem could be 
easily solved, then society would once again be able to rely on the tradi-
tional logic of profits and the institution of private property.  So viewed, 
it appears that Berle makes an empirical claim that separation of owner-
ship and control has robbed society and shareholders of the benefits that 
otherwise would accrue from the workings of the free-enterprise system.  
From the standpoint of traditional microeconomic theory, it appears that 
Berle is asserting that separation of ownership and control has resulted in 
the replacement of the classic entrepreneur with a managerial control 
                                                 
 21. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 nn.4–5 (2008).  Bratton and Wach-
ter, however, develop a contextual and nuanced reading of Berle’s work, showing the evolution in 
his thinking and the shifting historical context in which he thought and wrote.  Id.  They argue that 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property reflected Berle’s views at the midpoint of his trans-
formation from corporate lawyer to corporatist.  Id. at 118–23. 
 22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 333. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 333, 356. 
 25. Id. at 333. 
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group that is not motivated by the traditional logic of profits.  Finally, 
Berle appears to believe that “fixing” the problem is not feasible.26  If 
these empirical claims are false, then the problem of separation of own-
ership and control turns out to be “a tale . . . full of sound and fury, signi-
fying nothing.”27 
III.  FRANK KNIGHT—THE ENTREPRENEUR STILL REIGNS WITHIN THE 
MODERN CORPORATION 
The standard account of the Five Chapters stands in stark contrast 
to Frank Knight’s explanation of the role of the entrepreneur and the 
phenomenon of separation of ownership and control.  In Risk, Uncertain-
ty and Profit,28 Knight developed a theory of the entrepreneur that ranks 
even today as the seminal text on that subject.29  Knight’s account ex-
plained the unique, creative function played by the entrepreneur in deal-
ing with uncertainty.30  Importantly, Knight identified unification of 
ownership and control as central to the entrepreneur’s ability to func-
tion.31  However, unlike Berle, Knight argued that the modern corpora-
tion was operated as if by a classical entrepreneur. 
Knight viewed “the entrepreneur system of organization, with pro-
duction for the market impersonally, and concentration of direction” as 
the defining characteristic of the real world free-enterprise system.32  
Like Berle, Knight understood the role played by the prototypical entre-
preneur—the sole proprietor.  Indeed, Knight systematically modeled 
that role, concluding that the entrepreneur carries out two key functions: 
she manages—that is, she determines what products will be produced—
and she assumes the risk of her decisions—that is, she puts her personal 
wealth at risk as a means of guaranteeing to her employees that even if 
the venture fails, they will receive the compensation for which they bar-
gained.33  In other words, the entrepreneur was not an individual who 
simply charted a firm’s course in return for a salary.  Rather, the entre-
                                                 
 26. Berle did not think the problem could be easily solved, if at all.  See id. at 342–44. 
 27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5. 
 28. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit is the final version of Knight’s doctoral thesis, completed in 
1916 while a graduate student at Cornell University.  1 FRANK H. KNIGHT & ROSS B. EMMETT, 
SELECTED ESSAYS BY FRANK H. KNIGHT, at viii. (Ross B. Emmett, ed., Univ. of Chi. Press, 1999). 
 29. See S. Ramakrishna Velamuri & S. Venkataraman, Why Stakeholder and Stockholder 
Theories are not Necessarily Contradictory: A Knightian Insight, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 249, 251–62 
(2005); Nicolai Juul Foss, More on Knight and the Theory of the Firm, 14 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 269 (1993); Arthur H. Leigh, Frank H. Knight as Economic Theorist, 82 J. POL. 
ECON. 578 (1974). 
 30. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 264–76. 
 31. Id. at 349–53. 
 32. Id. at 351. 
 33. Id. at 270. 
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preneur was the person who specialized in “responsible direction.”34  By 
owning the firm, she put both her wealth and human capital at risk.  The-
reby, the entrepreneur was taking responsibility for her business judg-
ments. 
Like Berle, Knight understood that the modern corporation pre-
sented a phenomenon that must be woven into the fabric of the neo-
classical account of the modern market economy, if that account were to 
remain relevant.35  Knight acknowledged that the modern corporation 
with its salaried manager and apparently powerless shareholders seemed 
to be an institution in which ownership had been separated from control 
and thus, an institution operating without an entrepreneur.  Knight as-
serted, however, that an empirical analysis of actual corporations, 
coupled with an understanding of the psychological make-up of entre-
preneurs,36 would reveal that ownership and control remained effectively 
unified in the modern corporation.37 
Interestingly for corporation lawyers and scholars seeking insight 
about the judicial abstention doctrine modernly termed the “business 
judgment rule,” Knight believed that a proper understanding of the na-
ture of business judgment would lead to a discovery that the modern cor-
poration was actually managed and controlled by an approximation of 
the classic entrepreneur.38 
The first necessary step in understanding the distribution of control 
and responsibility in modern business is to grasp this fact: What we 
call ‘control’ consists mainly of selecting someone else to do the 
‘controlling.’  Business judgment is chiefly judgment of men.  We 
                                                 
 34. Id. at 271. 
 35. Frank Knight understood that “[t]he typical form of business unit in the modern world is 
the corporation.  Its most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with 
concentrated control.”  KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 291.  Further, he noted: 
Most [shareholders in the modern corporation] do not regard themselves and are not re-
garded as owners of the business.  In form they are owners, but in substance they are 
merely creditors, and both they and the insiders count upon the fact.  The great compa-
nies are really owned by small groups of men who generally know each other’s personali-
ties, motives and policies tolerably well. 
Id. at 359. 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 41–44. 
 37. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 291–99.  “The apparent separation between ownership and con-
trol turns out to be illusory.”  Id. at 297.  “Whenever we find an apparent separation between control 
and uncertainty—bearing, examination will show that we’re confusing essentially routine activities 
with real control.”  Id. at 298. 
 38. I have argued elsewhere that Knight’s theory of the entrepreneur and what I call “entrepre-
neur primacy” provide a basis for understanding the business judgment rule and other important 
corporation law cases and doctrines.   See O’Kelley, supra note 14. 
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know things by knowledge of men who know them and control 
things in the same indirect way. . . .39 
There is an apparent separation of the functions of making decisions 
and taking the ‘risk’ of error in decisions.  The separation appears 
quite sharp in the case of the hired manager, as in a corporation, 
where the man who makes decisions receives a fixed salary, taking 
no ‘risk,’ and those who take the risk and receive profits—the 
stockholders—make no decisions, exercise no control.  Yet a little 
examination in the light of the preceding discussion of indirect 
knowledge and indirect responsibility will show that the separation 
is illusory; when control is accurately defined and located, the func-
tions of making decisions and assuming the responsibility for their 
correctness will be found to be one and indivisible.40 
Finally, Knight believed that the psychological make-up of the en-
trepreneur provided the ultimate assurance that the apparent separation of 
ownership and control would not interfere with the operation of the cor-
poration primarily for the benefit of the shareholders.  “[Entrepreneurs] 
are not the critical and hesitant individuals, but rather those with restless 
energy, buoyant optimism, and large faith in things generally and them-
selves in particular . . . .”41  “Most human motives tend on scrutiny to 
assimilate themselves to the game spirit.  It is little matter, if any, what 
we have set ourselves to do . . . .  But once having set ourselves to 
achieve some goal it becomes imperative to achieve it.”42  In Knight’s 
view then, the typical entrepreneur sets a goal of pursuing maximum 
profits for the corporation and its shareholders and pursues that goal as if 
a game, with the boundless energy and enthusiasm that only a true entre-
preneur possesses.43 
For it is clear that the ‘personal’ interests which our rich and power-
ful businessmen work so hard to promote are not personal interests 
at all . . . .  The real motive is the desire to excel, to win at a game, 
the biggest and most fascinating game yet invented, not excepting 
even statecraft and war.44 
Thus, Knight’s account presented for empirical testing the proposi-
tion that the entrepreneur still reigns within the modern corporation and 
                                                 
 39. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 291–92. 
 40. Id. at 293–94. 
 41. Id. at 366. 
 42. Id. at 53. 
 43. Berle accepted the possibility that the control within the modern corporation might be 
properly motivated by a very small percentage of the firm’s profits.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 
at 343–44. 
 44. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 360. 
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that the modern corporation is in fact operated primarily for the benefit 
of the shareholders.  It laid the groundwork for the voluminous contracta-
rian accounts of the corporation birthed by law and economics scholars 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the most important of which45 
makes the case that shareholders and managers bargain for corporate go-
vernance rules ensuring that the modern corporation is operated primari-
ly in the interest of shareholders.46  Thus, if one accepts Knight’s ac-
count, or the modern contractarian account, Berle’s identification of the 
rise of the corporate system and the attendant separation of ownership 
and control as a paradigm-shifting event seems to have missed the mark.  
At most, separation of ownership and control (and the threat it poses to 
the incentives provided by the profit motive) is a technical problem to be 
solved by private contracting and appropriate government regulation of 
the securities markets.  However, it does not appear to represent or re-
quire a fundamental break with the laissez-faire system of private proper-
ty and the individualist ideology associated therewith. 
IV.  BERLE’S FAMILIARITY WITH THE WORK OF FRANK KNIGHT 
A surface reading of The Modern Corporation and Private Proper-
ty discloses no direct citation to Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and 
                                                 
 45. The foundational works in this regard are Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 
289–90 (1980). 
 46. Modernly, principal-agent theorists have argued persuasively that shareholders and manag-
ers do in fact contract for corporate governance systems that provide managers with strong incen-
tives to operate the firm as would a true entrepreneur and that shareholders discount what they pay 
for shares to reflect any residual loss that still can be expected to occur.  Owner/managers who sell 
shares to outsiders want to minimize the discount that purchasers will demand for anticipated shirk-
ing—actions taken that deviate from what the manager would do if he or she were still the owner of 
100% of the business, and thus still fully motivated by the traditional desire to maximize profits.  
Thus, managers voluntarily and in agreements with purchasers supplement the restraints provided by 
corporation and securities laws with private-ordering mechanism designed to optimally minimize the 
cost of anticipated future shirking.  Whatever anticipated residual loss from shirking remains will 
result in a corresponding reduction in the price at which the manager can sell shares to outsiders. 
The most illuminating example is an initial public offering by a corporation sole.  Before the public 
offering, the sole shareholder is the sole residual claimant and will bear fully the impact of her non-
shareholder-wealth-maximizing behavior as a manager.  Thus, the owner can be expected to respond 
as a classical entrepreneur in making resource allocation decisions.  After selling a portion of her 
shares, however, the former sole shareholder will only bear a portion of the cost of her non-
shareholder-wealth-maximizing behavior as a manager.  If the owner/manager could shift the cost of 
such post-sale shirking to prospective shareholders, then separation of ownership and control would 
be a serious problem.  But she cannot, because the prospective purchaser will discount for the proba-
bility of such misconduct.  Instead, the Seller willingly takes contractual steps to ensure prospective 
purchasers that shirking will be optimally minimized and accordingly, that the manager will continue 
to act similarly to a classical entrepreneur. 
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Profit.  However, a consideration of Berle’s intellectual connections with 
academics in the field of economics, the prominence of Knight and his 
work in those circles, and a careful read of the scholarly work Berle cited 
in the Five Chapters, leaves no doubt that Berle was intimately familiar 
with Knight’s work and his theories about the role of the entrepreneur. 
Without question, “Knight was ‘the dominant intellectual in influ-
ence’ in the economics department at the University of Chicago [between 
World War I and World War II], and, arguably the most important non-
Keynesian American economist of his generation.”47  From 1917 to 
1919, he taught at the University of Chicago as an instructor.  After an 
eight-year stint at the University of Iowa, he returned to the University of 
Chicago in 1928, where he remained for twenty-five years.48  Knight and 
his work, particularly Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, were at the center of 
scholarly debate about the workings of the modern economy during the 
1920s and early 1930s.  For example, while a student at the London 
School of Economics between 1929 and 1932, R.H. Coase worked on the 
first draft of his seminal article, The Nature of the Firm.49  In the final 
version of that article, Coase devoted more text to an analysis of Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit than to all of the other economic scholars he cited 
combined.50  On the pervasiveness of Knight’s intellectual influence dur-
ing his time at the London School of Economics, Coase later com-
mented: 
Knight’s ideas were so much in the air at LSE . . . .  Everyone at 
LSE referred to Risk, Uncertainty and Profit whether they had read 
it or not.51 
[Knight] was regarded at the London School of Economics as one 
of the greatest of economists and his book, Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profit, was closely studied by all serious students of economic 
theory.52 
                                                 
 47. KNIGHT & EMMETT, supra note 28, at vii (quoting George J. Stigler, Frank H. Knight, 3 
THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 56 (John Eatwell, Murray Millgate & Peter 
Newman eds., 1987)). 
 48. Id. at 323.  “Knight returned to Chicago in 1928 to take up the chair left vacant by J.M. 
Clark’s departure for Columbia University.”  GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: AGENCY, STRUCTURE, AND DARWINISM IN AMERICAN 
INSTITUTIONALISM 323 (Routledge 2004). 
 49. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning , 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 19, 20 (1988). 
 50. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  The article is nineteen full 
pages in length, plus a line or two.  Coase devotes more than six of those pages exclusively to 
Knight and Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.  Id. at 388, 392–95, 398–401. 
 51. Coase, supra note 49, at 20. 
 52. R.H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1993). 
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But Knight’s work during the time between the First World War 
and the New Deal was not limited to his path-breaking book.  Between 
1920 and 1933, Knight published at least fifty-three articles and reviews.  
During that period, Knight was heavily influenced by the work of Thors-
tein Veblen53 and deeply interested in developing his own version of in-
stitutional economics.54  Although today he is often, probably unfairly, 
labeled a neo-classicist, such label relates to Frank Knight’s work occur-
ring well after 1932.  The Frank Knight who wrote and participated in 
scholarly dialog in the pre-New Deal decade was as much an institutio-
nalist as a neo-classicist and was a member of the elite mainstream of 
academic economists, which group included in its number faculty mem-
bers at both Harvard and Columbia with whom Berle had strong, direct 
connections.55  Clearly anyone participating in debates within the field of 
economics during the 1920s and early 1930s, and particularly anyone 
involved in the scholarly life of the leading university departments of 
economics, would be intimately familiar with Knight and his theory of 
the entrepreneur.56 
Berle fits the bill of someone who would have been expected to 
know of Frank Knight and his work.  Berle was intensely interested in 
learning more about economics, particularly as it related to corporations.  
His study of corporation law in the early 1920s showed him the limita-
tion of seeking to understand the intricacies of business from the study of 
appellate decisions.  As he noted, “Corporate transactions and financial 
methods are invariably some years ahead of court interpretations.”57  Ac-
cordingly, Berle created opportunities to mingle with and learn from 
scholars in the field of economics.  This effort led Berle “far afield; and 
it resulted in two years’ traveling to the Graduate School of Business 
Administration at Harvard, nominally for the purpose of teaching the 
subject of corporation finance, but actually for the purpose of becoming 
                                                 
 53. While an instructor at Chicago from 1918 to 1920, Knight “was an influential member of a 
group that gathered together to read and discuss Thorstein Veblen’s works.”  HODGSON, supra note 
48, at 323. 
 54. KNIGHT & EMMETT, supra note 28, at xiii, xv. 
 55. Those closest to Berle included William Z. Ripley, Gardiner Means, and Rexford Tugwell, 
all of whom, like Frank Knight, were institutionalists influenced by Thorsten Veblen.  Thomas K. 
McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 REVS. AM. HIST. 578, 580 (1990); Rexford G. Tug-
well, The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, 3 W. POL. Q. 390, 406–10, 412, 423 (1950); Mal-
colm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 179 (2001). 
 56. During the decade preceding the Great Depression as now, American university depart-
ments of economics had different emphases, with the most influential schools being institutionalism 
and neo-classicism.  Frank Knight and his work cut across these lines.  See HODGSON, supra note 
48, at 323–24; Ross Emmett, “Frank Knight, Max Weber, Chicago Economics, and Institutional-
ism,” in ROSS EMMETT, FRANK KNIGHT AND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN AMERICAN ECONOMICS 112-
123 (2009). 
 57. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE vi (1928). 
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better acquainted with financial theory.”58  Berle used his time at Har-
vard well.  While attending Harvard College, Berle had been a student of 
William Z. Ripley, a prominent professor of economics.  During his 
teaching stint at Harvard, Berle renewed his relationship with Ripley, 
who subsequently cited Berle’s work on corporate law in Ripley’s in-
fluential book, Main Street and Wall Street.59  Ripley was later influenti-
al in helping Berle obtain funding for the study-of-corporations project 
that would culminate with the publication of The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.60  One thing led to another.  The funding of the 
study-of-corporations project led to Berle joining the faculty at Columbia 
Law School and to his hiring of Gardiner Means, then a graduate student 
in economics at Harvard, as a statistical and economics research assis-
tant.61  Both Ripley and Means were institutionalists, strongly influenced 
by Veblen.62  As Berle’s citations of Veblen show, Berle also was influ-
enced by Veblen.63  Thus, through all of these associations and his own 
institutionalist leanings,64 Berle was exposed to an environment similar 
to that experienced by R.H. Coase at the London School of Economics—
an environment in which the work of Frank Knight took center stage.65 
We are not left to surmise as to Berle’s familiarity with Frank 
Knight’s work however.  A careful reading of the footnotes in The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property tells the tale.  Most of The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property is heavily footnoted.  The Five 
Chapters are starkly different; the footnotes are few, and only four scho-
lars are directly cited.  Three of the cited scholars—Adam Smith,66 
                                                 
 58. Id. at vii. 
 59. Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247 (2010).  
See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 60, 92, 122 (1927). 
 60. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 2, at 20; Wells, supra note 59, text accompa-
nying notes 226–29. 
 61. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 2, at 21. 
 62. Rexford G. Tugwell, The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, 3 W. POL. Q. 390, 406–10, 
412, 423 (1950); Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 
173, 179 (2001). 
 63. See infra notes 68, 71–74. 
 64. Richard S. Kirkendall, A.A. Berle, Jr. Student of the Corporation 1917–1932, 35 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 43, 58 (1961); Rick Tilman, Apology and Ambiguity: Adolf Berle on Corporate Power, 8 
J. ECON. ISSUES 111, 111 (1974) (“Adolf A. Berle, Jr . . . must be considered at least a first cousin of 
institutional economists who compose the membership of the Association for Evolutionary Econom-
ics . . . .  His critique of neoclassicism and his emphasis on the evolution of economic institutions is 
markedly similar to that of other institutional economists of his generation.”). 
 65. On the environment at Columbia, see Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics at 
Columbia University, 36 HIST. POL. ECON. 31, 31–52 (2004).  On the environment at Harvard, see 
Valdemar Carlson, The Education of an Economist Before the Great Depression: Harvard’s Eco-
nomics Department in the 1920’s, 27 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 101 (1968). 
 66. Adam Smith, author of the The Wealth of Nations (1776), is now, and was at time Berle 
wrote, considered to be “the father of political economy.”  Amy Hewes, Economic Myths, 4 SOC. 
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Walther Rathenau,67 and Thorstein Veblen68 were and remain important 
in the history of economic thought.  By citing each of these scholars, 
                                                                                                             
SERVICE REV. 23, 27 (1930).  He was also identified with the “invisible hand” explanation of free 
markets. 
It was Adam Smith who first pointed out the fundamental role to be played by profits . . . 
in a capitalist economy: each individual’s actions are motivated by the desire for gain.  
Profits, that is, are the motive force behind economic decisions.  Furthermore, the pursuit 
of self-interest leads the individual by “an invisible hand” to promote social benefit from 
which springs the conventional wisdom among orthodox economists that capitalist mar-
ket economies function, theoretically, in a manner superior to planned socialist econo-
mies. 
Mark Obrinsky, The Profit Profits, 3 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 491, 491 (1981). 
 67. Walther Rathenau was a German industrialist, politician, and social critic whose books and 
pamphlets were widely read in the aftermath of World War I.  W.O Henderson, Walther Rathenau: 
A Pioneer of the Planned Economy, 4 ECON. HIST. REV. 98, 98–99 (1951).  His work included a 
detailed criticism of late capitalism that shared much in common with the work of Thorstein Veblen.  
See WALTHER RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO COME, 25–128 (Eden & Cedar Paul, trans., 1921) [hereinaf-
ter RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME].  However, he is most remembered as the father of economic plan-
ning and the planned economy.  Henderson, supra, at 98–108; Arnold Brecht, Walther Rathenau and 
the German People, 10 J. POL. 20, 34 (1948).  It seems likely that Berle viewed Rathenau as a kin-
dred spirit on multiple levels.  Both Berle and Rathenau had strict fathers who demanded excellence.  
Both men had difficulty working with others and assumed leadership roles because of the strength of 
their intellect, imagination, and capacity for hard work.  Both men were that rare combination—
doers and dreamers.  John McCarten, Profiles: Atlas with Ideas—Part II, NEW YORKER, Jan. 23, 
1943, at 22–24 [hereinafter McCarten II]; Brecht, supra at 31; HARRY KESSLER, WALTHER 
RATHENAU: HIS LIFE AND WORK, 7–8, 24 (Beston Press, 2008) (1928).  “There is no intellectual in 
the world to whom [Rathenau] would not have measured up in conversation or in writing.”  Brecht, 
supra at 36.  Both men understood persecution.  Berle, as an American of Germanic descent, felt its 
sting while an undergraduate at Harvard during World War II, for failing to change his name or join 
in anti-German manifestos.  BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS,supra note 2, at 5.  Rathenau “often 
complained that he was only ‘a second-class citizen’—unable in peacetime to aspire to the rank of 
lieutenant in the Prussian army.”  Henderson, supra at 102 (internal citation omitted).  In 1922, while 
serving as Germany’s foreign minister, Rathenau was assassinated solely because he was a Jew by 
individuals who wrongly doubted his patriotism.  Brecht, supra; WALTHER RATHENAU, 
INDUSTRIALIST, BANKER, INTELLECTUAL, AND POLITICIAN: NOTES AND DIARIES 1907–1922, at 10–
11 (Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann ed., Caroline Pinder Cracraft trans., Oxford 1985) (1967) [he-
reinafter RATHENAU, INDUSTRIALIST, BANKER, INTELLECTUAL, AND POLITICIAN].  It is likely that 
the young Berle saw much of himself as he hoped to be in Rathenau, who in 1909 was described as 
“one of ‘the 300 men, each knowing all the others, who together control the economic destiny of the 
Continent.’”  Henderson, supra at 98 n.4.  Berle was largely to realize that hope as one of Roose-
velt’s key advisors and confidants.  In reflecting on the role that he and a handful of others played, 
Berle later noted, “[i]rrespective of [history’s verdict as to our importance] we can comfort ourselves 
with consciousness that high privilege and great good fortune allowed us to be among the many co-
workers in a time of vast change.”  BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 2, at 115.  In that 
modest reflection, I imagine Adolf Berle saw himself as having successfully followed in the foot-
steps of Walther Rathenau. 
 68. Thorstein Veblen “was arguably the most original and penetrating economist and social 
critic that the United States has produced.”  RICK TILMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS CRITICS, 
1891–1963, at ix (Princeton 1992).  At the time Berle wrote the Five Chapters, Veblen was ac-
knowledged to be the father of American institutional economics.  “Perhaps the critical question 
which Veblen asked was, ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’  The attempted answer 
included, negatively, an attack upon the scientific validity of systematic economic theory as current-
ly expounded and constructively, the outlines of an evolutionary and institutional explanation of 
2010] Berle and the Entrepreneur 1155 
Berle was, of course, signaling his awareness of the important bodies of 
economic thought with which each man was associated.  But, he was 
signaling much more.  The repeated citation69 and criticism of Adam 
Smith placed Berle in the mainstream of scholars and business leaders 
who viewed laissez-faire individualism as a doctrine unsuited for the 
modern era.70  By citing Veblen,71 Berle paid tribute to the acknowledged 
                                                                                                             
economic behavior.”  Paul T. Homan, An Appraisal of Institutional Economics, 22 AM. ECON. REV. 
10, 10 (1932).  Moreover, it was already clear that Veblen had lived a life as a scholar and writer that 
would be judged kindly by history.  As noted in celebration of the 100th anniversary of Veblen’s 
birth: “Some men effectively catch the drift of development and have a vision of things to come.  
Such men become active forces in that very development and their names become landmarks and 
turning points.  Time alone is the final judge of a candidate’s right to inclusion in this select list.  
For, Veblen, time has rendered its verdict . . . .”  Joseph Dorfman, Source and Impact of Veblen, 48 
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1958). 
 Like Veblen, Berle caught the drift of things to come.  Veblen had near encyclopedic know-
ledge of western culture and command of several languages.  Rick Tilman & Andrea Fontana, Ital-
ian Debate and Dialogue on Thorstein Veblen: The Evolution of Appreciation for His Contributions 
Despite the Apathy of the Intelligentsia, 44 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 81, 88 (1985); RICK TILMAN, 
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, JOHN DEWEY, C. WRIGHT MILLS AND THE GENERIC ENDS OF LIFE, 3–4 (Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers 2004). 
 Berle was not far behind.  Like Berle, Veblen was deeply interested in understanding the mod-
ern corporation and its impact on society and, like Berle, Veblen saw corporate finance as the key to 
understanding the imperatives of the emerging corporate system. 
 Despite their similarities of insight and intellect, Veblen and Berle had very dissimilar life 
experiences.  Berle was rooted in urban America and graduated from Harvard Law School at age 
sixteen.  He immediately entered the world of the power elite as a Wall Street lawyer, academic, and 
public servant, and spent his life working with and near members of the power elite.  John McCar-
ten, Profiles: Atlas with Ideas—Part I, NEW YORKER, January 16, 1943 [hereinafter McCarten I].  
Veblen was raised on farms in near isolation from American society.  His parents had emigrated 
from Norway ten years before Veblen’s birth.  His father never learned English.  Veblen had great 
difficulty obtaining and keeping academic posts and lived much of his later life without formal em-
ployment.  RICK TILMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE ENRICHMENT OF EVOLUTIONARY 
NATURALISM 1–2 (2007).  In sum, Veblen “was a loner and academic drifter.”  Marc R. Tool, An 
Institutionalist Legacy: Remarks upon Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 
327, 327 (1989).  Despite Veblen’s inability to fit comfortably into elite society, he had an enormous 
influence on those he taught, directly and indirectly. 
 69. The entirety of Book 4, Chapter 3, “The Inadequacy of Traditional Theory,” is devoted to a 
critique of Adam Smith and the economic theories Berle attributed to Smith.  See BERLE & MEANS, 
supra note 1, at 345–51.  Additionally, Berle cites Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations on the 
first page of Book 4, Chapter 2, “The Traditional Logic of Profits.”  Id. at 340. 
 70. As the Great Depression deepened, American businessmen rapidly abandoned their resis-
tance to government intervention.  “By 1932 the American business community—or, at least, power-
ful elements in it—was moving fast towards ideas of central economic planning.  The nation, said a 
Vermonter, Ralph E. Flanders of the Jones and Lamson Machine Company, was approaching a new 
stage in human development—’the self-conscious direction of the mechanism of economic and 
social life to ends of general well-being. . . .  American business, as Henry I. Harrison summed it up, 
was coming to accept ‘the philosophy of a planned economy.’”  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933, at 183 (1957). 
 71. The very first citation in The Modern Corporation and Private Property is to “Thorstein 
Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise, N.Y. 1923.”  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, 
at n. 1. 
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patron saint of those seeking to transform America in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression.72  These citations also indicated Berle’s agreement 
with Veblen’s critique of late capitalism, including the significant role 
played by corporate finance in the control of the modern corporation73 
and the relationship between the modern corporation and the allocation 
of power in society.74  By citing Rathenau,75 Berle showed his belief in 
national economic planning, an idea championed by Rathenau both in 
theory and practice.76  To readers having a deeper familiarity with Ra-
thenau, Berle was also signaling his commitment to radical but incre-
mental change,77 his belief that the modern corporation should be trans-
                                                 
 72. The extent of Veblen’s actual influence on the New Deal and its policies is debatable.  
RICK TILMAN, THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN: UNRESOLVED ISSUES 199–232 
(Praeger 1996).  His status as patron saint of those who molded the New Deal, as well as those who 
sought greater change, is not. 
To the young American radicals of the 1930s, Thorstein Veblen was a kind of patron 
saint.  He was a home grown social theorist whose ironic thrusts at American capitalism 
seemed to grow more relevant in the chaos of depression.  Every shade of leftist opinion 
could find something to admire in Veblen. . . .  [M]any of his insights were common cur-
rency.  Everybody was talking about “conspicuous consumption,” “captains of industry,” 
“robber barons,” and even “pecuniary canons of taste.”  Veblen’s odd but striking termi-
nology provided many battle cries for the age. 
George M. Fredrickson, Thorstein Veblen: The Last Viking, 11 AM. Q. 403, 403 (1959). 
 73. See Malcolm Rutherford, Veblen on Owners, Managers, and the Control of Industry, 12 
HIST. POL. ECON. 434 (1980).  Berle was likely drawn to this aspect of Veblen’s work as a by-
product of his own expertise in corporate finance.  See also Forest G. Hill, Veblen, Berle and the 
Modern Corporation, 26 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 279 (1967). 
 74. SIDNEY PLOTKIN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE REVIVAL OF FREE MARKET CAPITALSIM 
171–72 (Janet Knoedler, Robert Prasch, Dell Champlin eds., 2007). 
 75. The second citation in The Modern Corporation and Private Property is to “Walther Ra-
thenau, ‘Die Neue Wirtschaft’, Berlin, 1918,” BERLE AND MEANS, supra note 1, at n.2.  Rathenau is 
the only person referenced in the concluding chapter of the Five Chapters, entitled “The New Con-
cept of the Corporation.”  Rathenau is referred to in the text of the first page of the concluding chap-
ter, with a citation to “‘Von Kommenden Dingen,’ Berlin, 1918, trans. By E. & C. Paul, (‘In Days to 
Come’), London, 1921, pp. 120, 121.”  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 353. 
 76. W.O. Henderson, Walther Rathenau: A Pioneer of the Planned Economy, 4 ECON. HIST. 
REV. 98 (1951).  In terms of Bratton and Wachter’s reexamination of Berle, Bratton, and Wachter, 
supra note 19, Berle may also have been signaling his corporatist leanings.  Rathenau was a leading 
proponent of corporatism, conceived of as a “perfectly tuned ‘post-competitive industrial order.’”  
Diethelm Prowe, Economic Democracy in Post-World War II Germany: Corporatist Crisis Re-
sponse, 1945-1948, 57 J. MODERN HIST. 451, 461 (1985) (citing CHARLES MAIER, RECASTING 
BOURGEOIS EUROPE: STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER 
WORLD WAR I, at 9–10 (Princeton, N.J. 1975)).  See also RATHENAU, INDUSTRIALIST, BANKER, 
INTELLECTUAL, AND POLITICIAN, supra note 65, at 26.  There are numerous definitions of the term 
“corporatism” and many different camps of corporatists.  Given Berle’s citation of Rathenau, it is 
interesting to see one author label Rathenau, Berle, and John Meynard Keynes as the leading mem-
bers of the “technocratic, procapitalist reformism” wing of corporatism.  Philippe C. Schmitter, Still 
the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. POL. 85, 87 (1974). 
 77. Rathenau advocated equalization of wealth, income, and educational opportunity; elimina-
tion of the right of personal inheritance; and heavy taxation of wasteful and luxury consumption.  
Henderson, supra note 65 at 104–105; RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 111.  Yet he 
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formed rather than destroyed,78 and his commitment to the preservation 
of America’s core political and social institutions.79 
The fourth reference was to an article by S. H. Nerlove, Recent 
Writings on Profits.80  Nerlove was unknown outside of academic circles.  
He joined the economics faculty at the University of Chicago in 1922, 
but when the department was split into economics and business adminis-
tration, he joined the business side of the split.81  Nerlove was intimately 
familiar with and favorably disposed to Berle’s corporation law scholar-
ship, which he cited not only in Recent Writings on Profits but also in an 
article published a year later, Insiders and Corporate Income Streams.82  
The scholar to whom Nerlove devoted the most text in Recent Writings 
on Profits was Frank Knight; the scholarly work to which Nerlove de-
voted the most text was Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.83  The 
propositions for which Nerlove cited Knight predominantly related to 
Knight’s analysis of perfect and imperfect competition and the role of the 
entrepreneur.  By citing Nerlove, Berle was signaling his own familiarity 
with Knight’s work, and giving clues as to how the Five Chapters could 
be read as a response to Knight’s influential theories about the firm and 
the entrepreneur. 
                                                                                                             
was against radical implementation of such changes.  “On the rare occasions when he joined in the 
discussion of domestic economic problems as a member of the Reich Cabinet, he limited himself to 
warning against panaceas and against radical breach with the economic past.”  Brecht, supra note 67, 
at 32.  Rathenau’s belief in incrementalism flowed from his understanding that innovation and tradi-
tion are in constant tension, and each has strengths and weaknesses.  Incremental progress was the 
responsible way forward.  RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 104–107.  As to the notion 
that his proposed reforms would depopulate Germany of the strong and talented, Rathenau replied: 
“The objection that the well-to-do will be supplied with a strong motive for emigration, is invalid.  
For such institutions will only develop to the extent in which they are regarded as justifiable and 
necessary; by slow degrees only will they reach their terminal form.”  Id. at 114.  Interestingly, Veb-
len was also an incrementalist.  See Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen: Incrementalist and Utopian, 32 
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 155 (1973). 
 78. Berle sided with the New Dealers who saw the modern corporation and its bigness as a 
necessary precondition to economic planning; he saw the efforts of the Brandeisians to break up the 
big firms and return to an idyllic past as fundamental error.  Both Rathnenau and Veblen agreed.  
Rathenau saw the modern corporation, properly regulated, but operated by entrepreneurial execu-
tives, as an indispensable economic institution.  RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 119–
123. 
 79. Though Rathenau’s reform goals appeared socialistic, he rejected socialism.  Henderson, 
supra note 67, at 99 (“[Rathenau was] a far-seeing reformer who would have recast capitalist society 
without introducing socialism.”). 
 80. S.H. Nerlove, Recent Writings on Profits, 2 J. BUS. U. CHI. 361 (1929). 
 81. Eric Ghysels & Marc Nerlove, The ET Interview: Professor Marc Nerlove, 9 
ECONOMETRIC THEORY 117, 119 (1993). 
 82. S.H. Nerlove, Insiders and Corporate Income Streams, 5 ACCT. REV. 153 (1930). 
 83. Nerlove’s article is twenty-two pages in length.  Specific textual reference to Frank Knight 
and Risk, Uncertainty and Profit occur on eleven of those pages.  See Nerlove, supra note 80, at 
362–64, 366, 368–70, 372, 374–76.  Implicit references occur throughout.  Significant reference is 
also made to the work of Maurice Dobb and C.J. Foreman. 
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V.   THE FIVE CHAPTERS AS A RESPONSE TO KNIGHT’S ECONOMIC 
THEORY 
A contextual interpretation suggests that a central purpose of the 
Five Chapters was to refute the still prominent belief that society should 
be organized on the basis of laissez-faire individualism and its extreme 
protection of private property rights.  As such, the Five Chapters were a 
response to the then dominant account of how a free-market economy 
optimally allocates economic resources: Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertain-
ty and Profit.84  However, Berle made the tactical choice to use Adam 
Smith as a straw man and not to target Knight and Knight’s analysis.  
Berle purported to be dissecting Adam Smith’s theories and pointing out 
their shortcomings.  In reality, he was asserting that even the most cur-
rent microeconomic explanations of free markets failed as an account of 
a world dominated by the modern corporation.85 
I surmise that Berle did this for four reasons.  First, Berle hoped 
that The Modern Corporation and Private Property would be read wide-
ly by the educated general public, much as had been the case for his 
mentor William Ripley’s book, Main Street and Wall Street.86  While 
Knight and his work were then prominent in academic circles, Knight 
was largely unknown to the educated general public.  Attacking Adam 
Smith would grab the attention of the educated general public,87 while 
focusing on Knight would have been a pointless distraction.  Second, 
using Adam Smith as a straw man allowed Berle to avoid getting bogged 
down in a heavily footnoted give and take with Knight, as had just hap-
pened in Berle’s “debate” with Merrick Dodd.88  Importantly, focusing 
openly on Knight would have required Berle to deal directly with 
Knight’s powerful account of the role played by the entrepreneur, even 
                                                 
 84. G. J. Stigler, A Generalization of the Theory of Imperfect Competition, 19 J. FARM ECON. 
707, 711 n. 8 (1937) (“For a more elaborate analysis of perfect competition, the classic treatment by 
F. H. Knight’s, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) should be consulted.”). 
 85. For a concise account of the transition from Adam Smith, through classical economists, to 
Frank Knight’s analysis of both perfect and imperfect competition theory, see Stigler, supra note 84. 
 86. For an account of the popular impact of Main Street and Wall Street and Ripley’s related 
articles, see Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247 
(2010). 
 87. Adam Smith made the perfect straw man because he and The Wealth of Nations had 
achieved cult status with both experts and the educated general populous. 
Adam Smith’s great treatise has taken, and retained a position which is unique.  It has be-
come a ‘classic’.  It has, unlike the mass of economic writing, established itself in the af-
fections of the layman as well as the expert; and, unlike the mass of economic writing al-
so, it has exchanged the fading laurels of ephemeral renown for a crown of abiding glory. 
L.L. Price, Adam Smith and his Relations to Recent Economics, 3 ECON. J. 239, 240 (1893). 
 88. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 21, at 122–30. 
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within the modern corporation.89  Berle preferred to take on Knight by 
scholarly sleight of hand.  A standard account of laissez-faire economic 
theory could be attributed to Adam Smith and described in simple, fol-
klore-like terms the content of which would be easily digestible by 
Berle’s target audience.  Berle could then make his points in similar 
sweeping terms.  Third, Adam Smith was a central part of the myth of 
individualism,90 and the myth of individualism was, in turn, the corner-
stone of America’s laissez-faire system of economic governance.91  
Berle’s goal was to paint a new myth that would support government 
regulation of the modern corporation.92  Myth-making93 and focusing on 
                                                 
 89. Knight has assigned the entrepreneur the central role in imperfect competition theory, that 
of combating uncertainty.  KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 264–76. 
 90. See C. Eric Mount, Jr., American Individualism Reconsidered, 22 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 
362, 365–66 (1981); Charles L. Griswold, Adam Smith: Conscience of Capitalism, 15 WILSON Q. 
53, 53–54 (1991); Lars Udehn, The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism, 28 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 479, 481–82 (2002). 
 91. For the classic account of how individualism came to control the hearts and minds of ordi-
nary Americans from the founding of the Republic to the New Deal, see Rexford Tugwell, The New 
Deal: The Rise of Business, Part II, 5 W. POL. Q. 483 (1952).  For a more theoretical account, see 
Rick Tilman, Durkheim and Veblen on the Social Nature of Individualism, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 1104. 
Property in the beginning had no existence save as an undifferentiated element of the so-
cial structure. . . .  [U]nder what circumstances did some individuals attain such identity 
and force of personality that property could be transferred from the collectivity to the sin-
gle individual?  Part of [Durkeheim and Veblen’s] answer is that this occurs through the 
promulgation of the myth of the metaphysical prepotency of individuals and the promo-
tion and acceptance of the myth of individualism by both self-serving individuals and the 
underlying population. 
Id. at 1107. 
 92. The Berle who wrote The Modern Corporation and Private Property was engaged with 
other public intellectuals in a struggle to shape and define the myth that would form the backdrop for 
the presidential election of 1932 and subsequent societal efforts to respond to the economic and 
social catastrophe we call the Great Depression.  Berle was that rare combination—a dreamer and a 
pragmatist.  Like others working in and around the seat of power, he knew that despite the objective 
failure of classic liberalism and its extreme protections of the prerogatives of private property own-
ership, the myth of individualism still held sway in the hearts and minds of most Americans.  
Change could occur only by molding a new myth that would support government regulation of busi-
ness and the economy.  We can see Berle’s efforts to develop this new myth begin to take shape in 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, but its contours are fleshed out in The New Indivi-
dualism, a campaign speech that Berle authored for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and in a later article, 
The New Deal and Economic Liberty.  However, the new myth Berle and other progressives sought 
to spin could not depart sharply from the entrenched myth of individualism. 
[Americans] believed in individualism, in independence, in liberty, in high living stan-
dards, and in democracy. . . .  They were sacred, although they had lost much of their 
meaning through abuse.  Individualism was invoked to escape caring for the indigent; in-
dependence was twisted to preclude union membership; liberty had its ironic modern de-
finition in freedom for corporations; high living standards were expected to be achieved 
on a wage that could be adjusted with no threat to profits. . . .  Progressivism had come to 
imply a differing from these interpretations; it meant really believing in individualism 
and in liberty, not only for powerful newspaper proprietors, but for workingmen and far-
mers, too. 
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the gritty details of Knight’s economic theory must have seemed incom-
patible projects to Berle.  Finally, Berle’s goal was to show that micro-
economic theory had no answer to the pressing problem of the day—the 
Great Depression.  Instead, the answer lay in government regulation.  To 
make that case, Berle needed a simple foil to show the inadequacy of 
laissez-faire economic policies in the era of the modern corporation.  
Adam Smith provided that foil, Knight did not.94 
The economic theory Berle attributed to Adam Smith emphasized a 
standard utilitarian approach to property rights—property rights should 
be assigned so as to ensure the maximum benefit to society.95  Leaving 
each individual free to use his human and physical productive property 
as he saw fit, each man’s pursuit of pecuniary self-interest would result 
in “the optimum satisfaction of human wants.”96  However, the modern 
corporation had made the traditional theories inadequate.  The separation 
of ownership and control meant that there was no classic own-
er/entrepreneur to be motivated by potential profits.  Accordingly, we 
can no longer base our public policies and our property laws on the eco-
nomic theories that worked for the world of the individual entrepreneur.97 
It is here that Berle played his straw-man trump card.  Not only is 
the problem posed by separation of ownership and control endemic in the 
modern corporation, it is a reality that even Adam Smith realized: 
                                                                                                             
Rexford G. Tugwell, The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, 3 W. POL. Q. 390, 400 (1950). 
 93. The difficulty in making new myths is amplified by the ease with which old myths are 
reinforced.  Berle was trying to bend this process to his ends. 
Economics, like so many other disciplines, is plagued with myths.  As lecturers and as 
writers of textbooks, we perpetuate economic interpretations that are based not on the 
original source material itself, but on an oral tradition that somehow becomes codified in-
to common knowledge. . . .  Often it may be that the creation of myths serves the conven-
ience of a ruling school of thought.  The straw men fabricated in economics are sufficient 
to stock many revivals of The Wizard of Oz.  By bolstering received wisdom, these myths 
douse the flames of heretics.  Perhaps more innocently, the inertia of ideas provide 
myths, once established, with a longevity that could not be otherwise intentionally 
gained. 
Craig Freedman, The Economist as Mythmaker: Stigler’s Kinky Transformation, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 
175, 177–178 (1995). 
 94. However, if scholars in the field of economics had been Berle’s target, then Risk, Uncer-
tainty and Profit would have been the appropriate foil. 
The concept of perfect competition received its complete formulation in Frank Knight’s 
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).  It was the meticulous discussion in this work that 
did most to drive home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously de-
fined concept [of perfect competition] and so prepared the way for the widespread reac-
tion against it in the 1930s. 
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 11 (1957). 
 95. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 340. 
 96. Id. at 345. 
 97. Id. at 333–44. 
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When Adam Smith talked of “enterprise,” he had in mind as the 
typical unit the small individual business in which the owner, per-
haps with the aid of a few apprentices or workers, labored to pro-
duce goods for market or to carry on commerce.  Very emphatically 
he repudiated the stock corporation as a business mechanism, hold-
ing that dispersed ownership made efficient operation impossible.  
“The directors of such companies, . . .” he pointed out, “being the 
manager rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected that they should watch over it with the same an-
xious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery fre-
quently watch over their own. . . .  Negligence and profusion, there-
fore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company.”98 
The conclusion to be drawn from Adam Smith himself was ob-
vious. 
Yet when we speak of business enterprise today, we must have in 
mind these very units which seemed to Adam Smith not to fit into 
the principles which he was laying down for the conduct of eco-
nomic activity.  How then can we apply the concepts of Adam 
Smith in discussing our modern economy?99 
By this deft use of the Adam Smith straw man, Berle sought to 
avoid a detailed analysis of the exact disease that infected laissez-faire 
market theory.  There was no need to take on Frank Knight’s empirical 
argument that the modern corporation was governed as if by a classic 
entrepreneur.  If even Adam Smith, writing before the industrial revolu-
tion, acknowledged that a very early analog of the modern corporation 
was an inherently unreliable vehicle for a free-market economy, then 
what more was there to discuss? 
While this device served Berle’s short-term ends well, it made 
possible the substantial confusion that exists today as to exactly what 
Berle believed and sought to achieve.  The above-cited passage is often 
interpreted today as showing that Adam Smith understood the agency 
problems inherent in the relationship between shareholders and directors.  
Berle’s reliance on this passage leaves him open to categorization as 
someone who believed that the main problem with the modern corpora-
tion was separation of ownership and control and that separation of own-
ership and control was a problem because of the consequent lack of as-
                                                 
 98. Id. at 346 (quoting 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 229 (Everyman’s Library 
ed.)). 
 99. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 346. 
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surance that the modern corporation was being operated primarily in the 
interests of the stockholders.100 
Had Berle more directly and transparently confronted Frank Knight 
and his work, a different picture of Berle’s work would have emerged.  It 
would be clear to present day readers that Berle viewed separation of 
ownership and control as merely a symptom.  Likewise, it would be clear 
that Berle was not concerned that those in control of the corporation 
would fail to make decisions as would a classic entrepreneur.  Rather, 
Berle believed that the disease plaguing the economy and society was the 
inequality of power that existed between the controllers of the modern 
corporation and the rest of society, most particularly workers.101 
Frank Knight’s analysis of the free market system in Risk, Uncer-
tainty and Profit would have been an ideal theoretical foil for Berle if his 
goal had been to address a more academic audience, because Knight’s 
work was an attempt “to isolate and define the essential characteristics of 
free enterprise as a system or method of securing and directing coopera-
tive effort in a social group.”102  As Knight too modestly summarized: 
“There is little that is fundamentally new in this book.  It represents an 
attempt to state the essential principles of the conventional economic 
doctrine more accurately, and to show their implications more clearly, 
than has previously been done.”103  Thus, Knight set out not to write a 
new and better myth of free markets, but to write a much more detailed 
and accurate account of the assumptions and rules that were implicit in 
the grand free-market theory that traced its origins to Adam Smith. 
 
                                                 
 100. For example: 
Eugene Fama and I have been working for several years to understand the characteristics 
that give survival value to . . . organizations like large public corporations characterized 
by separation of ‘ownership and control,’ or more precisely, separation of the decision 
management and residual risk bearing functions.  Scholars from Adam Smith [1776] to 
Berle and Means [1932] have pointed out the inconsistency of interests between manag-
ers and outside stockholders and emphasized the costs these conflicts generate. 
Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 328 (1983).  See 
also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
301, 301 (1983) (“Our goal is to explain the survival of organizations characterized by separation of 
‘ownership’ and ‘control’—a problem that has bothered students of corporations from Adam Smith 
to Berle and Means . . . .”); Edward A. Dyl, Corporate Control and Management Compensation: 
Evidence on the Agency Problem, 9 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 21, 21 (1988) (“The agency 
problem caused by the separation of ownership and control in large corporations has been discussed 
by numerous researchers interested in the corporate form of organization, ranging from the early 
work of Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) . . . .”). 
 101. One of the symptoms of that disease, of course, was the allocation of rewards and re-
sources in a socially harmful manner. 
 102. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at viii. 
 103. Id. at vii. 
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Central to Knight’s more detailed account of a free-market econo-
my was his description of the purpose of any economic system, be it 
free-market, socialist, or communist.  That purpose is the organization of 
economic activity. 
Organization is nearly synonymous with division of labor.  In orga-
nized activity, individuals perform different tasks, and each enjoys 
the fruits of the labor of others.  The two fundamental problems of 
organization are the assignment of tasks and the apportionment of 
rewards.104 
The first essential of the existing system is that it solves its two fun-
damental problems together, as one.  It is individualistic; it appor-
tions tasks through the apportionment of rewards; it is an automatic 
system, in which the interrelations of individuals are determined by 
self-seeking on the part of each.  The foundation of the process is 
the private ownership of productive resources—a synonym for indi-
vidual freedom. . . .  Modern society (on the economic side) is orga-
nized on the theory that the owners of productive resources will find 
their best use and place them in it, because in that way they can pro-
cure the largest returns for themselves.105 
To this point, Knight’s account seems similar to Berle’s recounting 
of the Adam Smith model, with the only new detail Knight adds being 
the identification of the fundamental task of economic system: the as-
signment of risk and reward.  However, Knight then explained the criti-
cality of how this task must be performed for the free-enterprise system 
to function as theorized. 
This system, therefore, involves the assumption that even in a com-
plex organization the separate contribution of each separate produc-
tive agency can be identified, and that free competitive relations 
tend to impute to each agency its specific contribution as its reward 
for participation in productive activity.  And to the extent that the 
system works at all, that we have an economic order and not chaos, 
this assumption must be justified.106 
In the above cited passage lies the key assumption made by general 
economic theory from Adam Smith to Frank Knight: the workings of the 
free market will result in each worker receiving the value of his or her 
contribution to the firm’s overall product, as such separate contribution 
is determined by competitive market forces.  In the early nineteenth cen-
tury world for which Adam Smith’s economic theory seemed ideal, mar-
                                                 
 104. Id. at 55. 
 105. Id. at 56–57. 
 106. Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
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kets worked competitively and without structural inequality of bargain-
ing power.  Products were made by time-tested methods that had been in 
existence for centuries.  There was no concentration of productive prop-
erty into a small number of hands.  Consequently, what a worker could 
expect to receive for her services in the market would in most cases be 
perceived as a “fair” return for the value that she had contributed in the 
creation of the product. 
But the world Berle and his anticipated readers lived in was one in 
which the laissez-faire economy, dominated by the modern corporation, 
was perceived as failing to deliver the promised optimal allocation of 
economic resources.  On the production side of the economy, factories, 
equipment, and men stood idle; industry seemed unable or unwilling to 
use its capacity.  On the supply side of the equation, workers were un-
employed in unprecedented numbers,107 and those who were employed 
earned a wage and worked in conditions that were widely viewed as un-
fair.108  This failing could not be addressed within traditional economic 
theory, because allocating rewards efficiently was assumed to equate with 
allocating them fairly. 
The failure of the laissez-faire system and the modern corporation 
to allocate rewards fairly was part of the disease Berle diagnosed, along 
with the associated failure to fully use the country’s productive capaci-
ty.109  The two failures worked hand-in-hand.  The underpayment and 
poor treatment of workers created the chaos that Knight’s theory pre-
dicted would occur if the system did not fairly reward workers for their 
contribution to the corporation’s product.110  Workers had little loyalty 
                                                 
 107. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933, at 167–71 
(1957). 
 108. Id. at 113–16.  In short, something was not right with America, and everyone sensed it. 
Our peculiar history makes equality more real to us than to people in some other lands, 
though this has become less true in the twentieth century because of the disappearance of 
free land to which everyone had thought he could go and plant himself along with his 
crops with some assurance of security.  Those to whom the traditional alternative was no 
longer open were learning the weakness of maintaining that such opportunity still existed 
when, in fact, it did not.  They still believed that it ought to be so; but they no longer pre-
tended so consistently that it was so.  The more fortunate folk found, to their concern, 
that a deep unrest was pulsing through the less prosperous population. . . .  Those who 
were filled with this unrest were not seeking after strange philosophies.  What they 
wanted was what they had always been told they possessed.  It had been drilled into them 
from their earliest years that anyone who worked and saved could “make good”—that is, 
could acquire competence and status.  Through no fault of their own, and in spite of faith-
fully following all the copybook maxims, they were finding that they had no success.  
Sometimes they had been swindled.  And they were not liking it. 
Rexford Tugwell, The New Deal: The Rise of Business, Part I, 5 W. POL. Q. 274, 280 (1952). 
 109. FREDRICK L. ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1920’S, at 297–
98 (First Perennial Classics ed. 2000) (1931). 
 110. SCHLESINGER, supra note 107, at 159–60. 
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and trust in their employers.  Workers had little to spend and their lack of 
security made them reluctant to spend what they had.  The chronic unde-
rutilization of factories created a large number of unemployed who had 
nothing at all to spend.  The twin failures of under-compensation of 
workers and underutilization of productive capacity reinforced each oth-
er, resulting in a deflationary spiral all too similar to economic conditions 
experienced in America and Europe in the so-called “Great Recession” 
that began in 2008.111 
The standard account of the Five Chapters describes Berle as con-
cerned about the separation of ownership and control and its negative 
impact on stockholders.112  In fact, Berle viewed separation of ownership 
and control as merely a symptom of the deeper problem—the concentra-
tion of power in a relatively few hands accomplished by the rise of the 
modern corporation and the corporate system.  While he had concern for 
the misuse of that power to the detriment of stockholders’ reasonable 
expectations, Berle had equal or greater concern for the detrimental ef-
fects experienced by workers, consumers, and society as a whole. 
This point is made clearly in the final of the Five Chapters.  Quot-
ing Walther Rathenau, Berle describes the modern corporation as go-
vernmental in nature.113  “The depersonalization of ownership, the objec-
tification of enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor, 
leads to a point where the enterprise becomes transformed into an institu-
tion which resembles the state in character.”114  Berle then describes the 
essential problem posed by, or the disease afflicting, the modern corpora-
tion and the emerging corporate system. 
                                                 
 111. See Tugwell, supra note 91. 
The truth of this matter was beginning to make itself felt rather widely even before 1933.  
People were beginning to understand that the so-called capitalist system could not con-
tinue to run as the capitalists were running it.  It would simply slow down and stop.  The 
year 1929 had looked, to many of them, like the often predicted end of the world.  The 
abstraction and making inert of income had been ruinous.  There had to be immediate, 
complete connection between input and output, between goods turned out and purchasing 
power with which to buy them.  There were glaring difficulties which anyone could see.  
Some income was abstracted by the nonproductive or spent in nonregenerative activities; 
more was immobilized to provide security for favored groups; and some was being used 
for wasteful competition which resulted in no social benefits.  These leaks, running off 
into stagnant, sometimes stinking pools were sufficient to stop everything occasionally, 
and most of the time they prevented full activity.  Only once in a while did a period occur 
when wastes were stopped or when purchasing power was, for the moment, equal to pro-
ductive power. 
Id. at 498 (emphasis in original). 
 112. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 113. RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 121. 
 114. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 352 (quoting VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, 121 (E. & C. 
Paul, trans., Berlin 1921)). 
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On the one hand, [the modern corporation] involves a concentration 
of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of 
religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the 
national state.  On the other hand it involves the interrelation of a 
wide diversity of economic interests—those of the “owners” who 
supply capital, those of the workers who “create,” those of the con-
sumers who give value to the products of enterprise, and above all 
those of the control who wield power. 
Such a great concentration of power and such a diversity of interest 
raise the long-fought issue of power and its regulation—of interest 
and its protection.  A constant battle has been wielded between the 
individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the subjects of 
that power.  Just as there is a continuous desire for power, so also is 
there a continuous desire to make that power the servant of the bulk 
of the individuals it affects.115 
In this passage, Berle reveals his true concern as it relates to 
Knight’s analysis of the underpinnings of a free-market economy and the 
entrepreneur’s role therein.  Because of the structural imbalance of pow-
er between those who control the modern corporation and the other re-
lated interests, labor is not receiving its just rewards, consumers are not 
receiving competitive prices, and society as a whole, including the un-
employed, are not receiving the full utilization of the nation’s productive 
property.  The problem is not that those in control of the modern corpora-
tion will not ruthlessly pursue self-interest and profit.  The problem is 
that they will.  Put in terms of Knight’s theory, the problem is not that 
the modern corporation is not managed as if by a classic entrepreneur.  
The problem is that it is.  And the ultimate problem is that those in con-
trol of the modern corporation couple their selfish pursuit of profit with 
overwhelming bargaining power.  As a result, the control group causes 
the modern corporation to expropriate a portion of the gains from trade 
that fairly are attributable to the contributions of labor, consumers, and 
society as a whole. 
To Berle, the nature of the modern corporation’s “profits” and the 
allocation of those profits are both critically important.  The standard 
account of the Five Chapters interprets Berle as asserting that the con-
trollers within the modern corporation expropriate rewards that should be 
allocated to the shareholders.  However, this is a misreading of Berle.  As 
noted in the previous paragraph, Berle viewed the modern corporation’s 
profits as made up in part of sums that should be paid to labor and in part 
of sums that should benefit consumers in the form of lower prices.  Con-
                                                 
 115. Id. at 352–53. 
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trary to the standard account, Berle believed that stockholders shared in 
the expropriated gains. 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property and related writ-
ings, Berle details the numerous legal loopholes and devices whereby the 
control group pays itself a share of the corporation’s profits to the exclu-
sion of the stockholders.  But, importantly, the control group also pays 
out a substantial portion of the corporation’s profits as dividends in 
which all shareholders benefit pro rata.  Moreover, the control group 
shares pro rata with all stockholders the portion of the corporation’s 
market capitalization that is attributable to expropriated profits.  We can 
now understand why Berle argued that stockholders should only be en-
titled to a “sufficient” share of profits.116  Berle suspected that non-
controlling stockholders as a group actually received more from sharing 
a portion of the sums expropriated from workers, consumers, and society 
as a whole, than they would have received from pro rata receipt of all 
profits that would remain in a corporation that did not engage in expropr-
iation at all.  In other words, far from being a champion of shareholder 
primacy, Berle suspected that the shareholders were actually net benefi-
ciaries of the great concentrations of power within the modern corpora-
tion. 
It is easy to forget that Berle wrote The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property not as a matter of abstract theory, but at a time of ex-
treme national crisis.117  His later works show that his concerns for cor-
porate power were not limited to times of such crises.118  Nonetheless, his 
primary concern was that of his immediate experience—a time of 
enormous uncertainty and tremendous national and individual trauma 
and suffering.  As Berle wrote in the last of the Five Chapters, “in time 
                                                 
 116. “[T]he security holder must be compensated if an enterprise is to raise new capital and 
expand its activity just as the workers must be paid enough to insure the continued supplying of 
labor and the taking of the risks involved in that labor and in the life based on it.  But what if profits 
can be made more than sufficient to keep the security holders satisfied, more than sufficient to in-
duce new capital to come into the enterprise?  Where is the social advantage in setting aside for the 
security holder, profits in an amount greater than is sufficient to insure the continued supplying of 
capital and taking of risk?”  Id. at 342–43. 
 117. The tragedy of the Great Depression defies easy summarization; attempting to provide a 
coherent account of an event that played out each day in the shattered lives of the vast majority of 
Americans is a daunting literary and historical venture.  For a compelling chronicle of the human 
stories that make up the Great Depression, see T. H. WATKINS, THE HUNGRY YEARS: A NARRATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION IN AMERICA  (Henry Holt 1999).  Still, raw numbers give a 
backdrop against which to understand the scale of the crisis and unfolding tragedy.  “[Between 1929 
and 1933] Gross National Product fell by 30 per cent, industrial production virtually halved and farm 
prices fell by about 60 per cent.  The construction industry was badly hit and investment fell dramat-
ically.  Unemployment rose from 3 per cent to around a quarter of the workforce.”  FIONA VENN, 
THE NEW DEAL 7 (Edinburgh University Press 1998). 
 118. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER (Harcourt Brace 1969). 
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of depression, demands are constantly put forward that the men control-
ling the great economic organisms be made to accept responsibility for 
the well-being of those who are subject to the organization.”119  And 
what they should be made to do was accept “a program comprising fair 
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and sta-
bilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits 
from the owners of passive property.”120 
Ultimately, of course, the cure for the disease that Berle and those 
for whom he wrote experienced could not be found in microeconomic 
theory.  It could not be found in the entrepreneur’s self-interested pursuit 
of profits.121  The answer lay in applying macroeconomic policies.  Only 
the government, through regulation, direct expenditures, and tax policy, 
could take the necessary steps to stabilize employment, to provide eco-
nomic support to those without work, and to stimulate demand during 
cycles when the inherent nature of free markets produced curtailment in 
employment and production.122 
Knight fully agreed with Berle on this central point.  Like Berle, 
Knight saw that the real economy did not always work as envisioned by 
microeconomic theory and that periodic imbalances could only be cured 
by government intervention and macroeconomic theory.  Moreover, he 
expressed these views in 1923, well before the Great Depression awa-
kened others to the failings of a pure laissez-faire market economy. 
[A]s industry is organized under the competitive system, costs 
which from the social standpoint are fixed may often be avoided by 
the owner of the business when demand falls off, by simply leaving 
the productive factors, especially labor, unemployed and allowing 
their services to go to waste. . . .  The industrial entrepreneur, who 
buys from other entrepreneurs partial products of large value and 
who hires productive services, especially labor, on short term con-
tracts, can reduce his own costs, though not the real costs of the in-
dustry to society, by reducing output or shutting down.  Undoubted-
ly, this fact goes far in explaining the phenomenon of the business 
cycle, since it involves, as Professor Clark points out, a vicious cir-
                                                 
 119. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 353. 
 120. Id. at 356. 
 121. As to the possibility that the problem of unemployment could be solved by reliance on the 
market and the voluntary action of business, Berle concluded, “I am inclined to doubt whether busi-
ness will take up the slack by any process of exhortation.  If it is profitable, it will do so; if it is un-
profitable it will not.” Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The New Deal and Economic Liberty, 37 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 46 (1935) [hereinafter Berle, New Deal and Economic Liberty]. 
 122. As Berle summarized in his first memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt in May, 1932, “Both 
as a matter of sound economics and decent humanity, an economic policy of the government ought 
to be adopted toward the restoration of individual safety.”  BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra 
note 2, at 33. 
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cle; each curtailment reduces the demand from other products and 
helps to force curtailment in other industries. . . .  He has placed his 
finger upon an inherent and far-reaching weakness in the competi-
tive system as a method for social organization.  It seems probable 
that any provisions which promise to deal adequately with this dis-
harmony and to iron out the disastrous fluctuations of industry must 
carry us no inconsiderable way in the direction of socialism.123 
In the end, the world views and theories of Berle and Knight, one a spe-
cialist in law, the other a specialist in economics, had much in common, 
unlike the vast divide that often separates those writing today who claim 
lineage to one or the other of these two intellectual giants. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is understandable why Berle chose not to directly engage the 
work of Frank Knight, then dominant in the world of traditional econom-
ic theorists.  But, had he done so, the resulting synthesis would have been 
illuminating.  Knight was no apologist for the free-enterprise system124 
and took pains to alert readers of Risk, Uncertainty and Profit to that 
fact.  “The net result of the inquiry is by no means a defense of the exist-
ing order.  On the contrary, it is probably to emphasize the defects of free 
enterprise.”125  Moreover, like Berle,126 Knight believed that for all its 
shortcomings, capitalism still held promise when compared to alternative 
institutions. 
The fundamental fact about society as a going concern is that it is 
made up of individuals who are born and die and give place to oth-
ers; and the fundamental fact about modern civilization is that it is 
dependent upon the utilization of three great accumulating funds of 
inheritance from the past, material goods and appliances, know-
ledge and skill, and morale.  Besides the torch of life itself, the ma-
terial wealth of the world, a technological system of vast and in-
                                                 
 123. Frank H. Knight, Economic Theory and Practice—Discussion, 13 AM. ECON. REV. 105, 
106–07 (1923). 
 124. “Central to Knight’s disenchantment with liberalism was his understanding of the self-
contradictions inherent in liberalism.  Intended to build on the value of individual differences and the 
commitment to the search for truth and justice, liberalism was fine for a society that viewed its chief 
problem as organizational efficiency for the purpose of satisfying given wants.  But the most impor-
tant social problems are the decisions as to what we should want and what rules to use for mutual 
relationships, not those of organizational efficiency.  For those problems, liberalism fails because the 
only test it offers for choosing among competing solutions are public opinion and coercion.  Liberal-
ism, therefore, undermines the social discussion of changes in wants and laws which it is designed to 
build upon.”  KNIGHT & EMMETT, supra note 28, at xix.  See also Angus Burgin, The Radical Con-
servatism of Frank H. Knight, 6 MODERN INTELL. HIST. 513, 513–538 (2009). 
 125. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at viii. 
 126. Berle, New Deal and Economic Liberty, supra note 121, at 45–46. 
1170 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
creasing intricacy and the habituations which men for social life 
must in some manner be carried forward to new individuals born 
devoid of all these things as older individuals pass out.  The existing 
order, with the institutions of private property (in self as well as 
goods), inheritance and bequest and parental responsibility, affords 
one way for securing more or less tolerable results in grappling with 
this problem.  They are not ideal, nor even good; but candid consid-
eration of the difficulties of radical transformation, especially in 
view of our ignorance and disagreement as to what we want, sug-
gest caution and humility in dealing with reconstructive propos-
als.127 
It is interesting to contemplate how Berle might have set out his ar-
guments and theories had he more directly engaged Knight and his theo-
ries.  Each knew the other’s discipline well.  Each had a powerful intel-
lect.  In the end, what separated Berle and Knight was not so much their 
theories, but there interactions with the real world.  While a dreamer and 
a thinker, time and again Berle came down from the ivory tower of 
theory to actively seek to mold the world into a better place.128  In con-
trast, Knight was the archetypal academic.129  A more transparent en-
gagement by Berle of Knight’s work might have resulted in Berle pre-
senting his own theories more clearly.  Moreover, it might have pro-
voked an actual dialog between Knight and Berle—a dialog that one can 
imagine might have pushed the work of each man even more to the fore-
front of thinking about the modern corporation. 
Looking to the future, what are the implications of rethinking tradi-
tional interpretations of foundational corporate law texts?  One major 
implication has come to occupy my thinking.  Corporation law scholar-
ship for the last three decades has been dominated by the Chicago-style 
version of neo-classical microeconomic theory and the myth of indivi-
dualism.  To what extent has this dominance resulted from an ahistorical 
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reading of Adolf Berle’s foundational work?  To what extent does the 
explanation lie in the fact that corporation law scholars’ understanding of 
economics is derived largely and derivatively from the work of modern 
economists, rather than being grounded upon a direct engagement with 
the works of giants of the near past, including Frank Knight, Thorstein 
Veblen, and Walther Rathnau?  To what extent does the explanation lie 
in a more general lack of historical knowledge that increasingly obscures 
our understanding of theorists, like Berle, whom we continue to cite? 
I do not know the answer to these questions, but I have come to be-
lieve that the road forward for the academy of corporation law scho-
lars—if we wish to play a meaningful role in the evolution of the modern 
corporation—will require a collective effort to recapture the past.  The 
road forward should include the widespread reconsideration of the trans-
formation of American society caused by industrialization, the introduc-
tion of modern modes of power transmission, transportation, and com-
munication, and the parallel rise in power of financial capital.  Further, 
the road forward must consider the role of mythology in shaping our go-
verning institutions.  Rather than searching for novel normative and de-
scriptive accounts of the corporation, the road forward should be focused 
on developing a theory of the modern firm grounded in historical reality, 
and transparently built on the insights of the great giants who worked, 
thought, and wrote as this transformation occurred. 
The study of Adolf Berle would surely be a part of such project, as 
would a study of Marx and Weber and Veblen.  But other, now lesser-
known but no less important, contributors to understanding corporations, 
law, and society, including Knight, should be resuscitated for modern 
audiences.  The blueprint for future scholarship suggested by this article, 
then, involves a significant reorientation.  The road forward should in-
clude a sustained and humble collective effort to inform the present 
about the largely forgotten past, so that corporation law scholarship is 
broadened and enriched with a deeper understanding of law, economics, 
and the nature of the modern corporation. 
 
